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Office of the Attorney General
One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698
Atn: Susan Paulson
August 31, 2001
The Massachusetts Farm Bureau Federation, Inc. has submitted comments on the
Brown Beauty Initiative, Petition #01-14, to the Massachusetts Attorney General.
This response was prepared by attorney Lowell Finley, who drafted the proposed
law for Save Our Horses, sponsor of Brown Beauty's bill.
The Massachusetts Farm Bureau Federation argues that the Attorney General
should not allow the initiative on the ballot for three reasons. It claims,
first, that the initiative is vague; second, that it is preempted by federal
law; and third, that the "private right of action" it establishes is
"unfair and perhaps illegal." As demonstrated below, none of these
arguments has merit, and even if they did, they are not grounds on which the
Attorney General has the authority to stop an initiative from going before the
voters.
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts specifies the exclusive
substantive grounds on which an initiative may be kept off the ballot, as
follows:
Section 2. Excluded Matters. - No measure that relates to religion,
religious practices or religious institutions; or to the appointment,
qualification, tenure, removal, recall or compensation of judges; or to the
reversal of a judicial decision; or to the powers, creation or abolition of
courts; or the operation of which is restricted to a particular town, city or
other political division or to particular districts or localities of the
commonwealth; or that makes a specific appropriation of money from the
treasury of the commonwealth, shall be proposed by an initiative petition; but
if a law approved by the people is not repealed, the general court shall raise
by taxation or otherwise and shall appropriate such money as may be necessary
to carry such law into effect.
Neither the eighteenth amendment of the constitution, as approved and
ratified to take effect on the first day of October in the year nineteen
hundred and eighteen, nor this provision for its protection, shall be the
subject of an initiative amendment.
No proposition inconsistent with any one of the following rights of the
individual, as at present declared in the declaration of rights, shall be the
subject of an initiative or referendum petition: The right to receive
compensation for private property appropriated to public use; the right of
access to and protection in courts of justice; the right of trial by jury;
protection from unreasonable search, unreasonable bail and the law martial;
freedom of the press; freedom of speech; freedom of elections; and the right
of peaceable assembly.
No part of the constitution specifically excluding any matter from the
operation of the popular initiative and referendum shall be the subject of an
initiative petition; nor shall this section be the subject of such a petition.
The limitations on the legislative power of the general court in the
constitution shall extend to the legislative power of the people as exercised
hereunder.
Mass. Const. Art. XLVIII, The Initiative, II, sec. 2.
It is clear from a thorough reading of this constitutional provision that
none of the alleged defects cited by the Farm Bureau Federation is covered.
Thus, even if the alleged defect were a real one, it would not give the Attorney
General the authority to prevent the initiative from appearing on the ballot.
We can now turn to a separate examination of each of the three flaws from
which the Farm Bureau Federation claims the initiative suffers.
The Farm Bureau Federation contends that horses are assembled, shipped,
bought and sold in the state for recreational use and farm use, as well as for
slaughter. It therefore argues the initiative is vague because "[i]t would
be impossible to distinguish the ultimate use of various animals or the
intentions of the ultimate buyer." The initiative is, however, quite clear
and explicit about what it prohibits. Proposed Chapter 272, Section 78B,
subdivision (a) provides that "no person shall slaughter a horse or other
equine for food for human consumption, nor shall any person receive, possess,
offer for sale, sell, offer to buy, buy, offer to give away, give away, or
transport any horse or other equine where that person knows or should know
that it will be slaughtered for food for human consumption." (Italics
added.)
Under the italicized language, a person could be convicted of a criminal
violation, or held liable for a civil penalty, only if it could be proven that
the person knows or should know that the horse or other equine the person is
selling, buying, transporting, etc., will be slaughtered for human consumption.
That is an issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, not vagueness.
The initiative does not purport to regulate transport of horses or other
equines into or out of the state. It does not discriminate against interstate
commerce in favor of intrastate commerce. Indeed, the initiatives purpose is not
the regulation of commerce, but to protect horses "as an important part of
the heritage of Massachusetts" and prevent theft and consumer fraud.
Courts considering Commerce Clause challenges are tolerant of state laws that
are not designed to achieve economic benefits but rather to advance social
welfare, safety, or other non-economic goals:
When there is a reasonable basis for legislation to protect the social, as
distinguished from the economic, welfare of a community, it is not for the
Court because of the Commerce Clause to deny the exercise locally of the
sovereign power of the [state].
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951). This deference to
non-economic regulation by states is based on the Supreme Courts view of the
proper balance between state and federal authority under the Constitution:
In determining whether the state has imposed an undue burden on interstate
commerce, it must be borne in mind that the Constitution when "conferring
upon Congress the regulation of commerce, . . . never intended to cut the
States off from legislating on all subjects related to health, life, and
safety of their citizens, though the legislation may affect commerce and
person engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it, within the
meaning of the Constitution." [Citations.]
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of local
regulations that are designed to prevent fraud or deception. California v.
Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941). The initiatives purpose of protecting an
animal that is "an important part of the heritage of Massachusetts" is
also likely to be regarded by courts as a legitimate state purpose. It is
comparable to the declared purpose of Congress in enacting the "Wild
Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act," 85 Stat. 649, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1970 ed., Supp. IV.) Congress deemed these animals "living symbols of the
historic and pioneer spirt of the West." 16 U.S.C. § 1331. The Senate
committee found:
[These animals] have been cruelly captured and slain and their carcasses
used in the production of pet food and fertilizer. They have been used for
target practice and harassed for "sport" and profit. In spite of
public outrage, this bloody traffic continues unabated, and it is the firm
belief of the committee that this senseless slaughter must be brought to an
end.
S. Rep. No. 92-242, pp. 1-2 (1971), quoted in Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976).
The Farm Bureau Federation cites a single trial court decision, Animal
Legal Defense Fund Boston, Inc. v. Provimel Veal Corporation, 626 F.Supp.
278 (D.Mass. 1986) in support of its claim that the initiative is preempted by
unspecified federal statutes and regulations on interstate shipment of livestock
and slaughter of animals for human consumption. That case, however, is readily
distinguishable. First, the ALDF case involved veal calves, not horses or other
equines. Second, the case concerned detailed meat labeling and animal feed
requirements that are not implicated by the Brown Beauty initiative. The ALDF
court found that the plaintiffs request for an order under state law requiring
labeling of veal meat sold in the state to disclose that the calves are raised
in dark, confined pens, fed iron-deprived diets, and given feed that contains
antibiotic drugs was pre-empted by "the comprehensive federal scheme
regulating the labeling, packaging and marketing of meat and the use of
medicated animal feeds." Id. at 281. That comprehensive federal
scheme has no bearing on an initiative that simply bans slaughter of horses for
human consumption, and related possession, ownership transactions, and
transport.
The Farm Bureau Federation argues that the initiatives private right of
action is "illegal" or "improper" because "courts have
found in the past that private parties cannot enforce criminal statutes."
The statement of the general legal principle is correct. See Whitley v.
Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 961, 962 (1975) (the rights to pursue criminal
prosecution "are not private but are in fact lodged in the Commonwealth as
it may proceed to enforce its laws"). See also Tarabolski v. Williams,
419 Mass. 1001 (1994); Taylor v. Newton Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't,
416 Mass. 1006, 1006 (1993) ("it is settled beyond cavil that a private
citizen has no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of
another"). But see Katz v. Commonwealth & Others, 379 Mass. 305
(1979).
That general principle does not apply here, however, because the private right
of action created by the initiative is civil rather than criminal in nature.
Stated differently, the initiative does not empower a private citizen initiate
or to act as prosecutor in a criminal case. Rather, proposed section Chapter
272, Section 78C authorizes a private "civil action" to recover a
"civil penalty."
Finally, the Farm Bureau Federation complains that the private right of
action provision authorizes an award of costs to a prevailing plaintiff but not
to a prevailing defendant. Suffice it to say that the Massachusetts General Laws
already contain at least one major law with such a unilateral cost award
provision. See M.G.L. - Ch. 151B, Section 5 (award of attorneys fees and
costs to prevailing employment discrimination complainant). Cf. M.G.L. -
Ch. 149, Section 185 (authorizing award, in employee whistle-blower cases, of
costs and attorneys fees to all "prevailing plaintiffs" but to
defendant employers only where the court finds the employees action to be
"without basis in law or in fact," and only then if the employee has
not voluntarily dismissed action with a reasonable time after determining that
the employer would not be found liable in damages).
Prepared for Save Our Horses by
Law Offices of Lowell Finley
1604 Solano Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94707-2109
Telephone: 510-290-8823
Fax: 510-526-5424
"Keep America's horses in the stable and off the table!"
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Copyright © 2002 - HOOFPAC Political Action Committee - All rights reserved.
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